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The legitimacy or illegitimacy of information exchanges among competitors remains a contemporary debate under EU competition law and policy. This paper revisits the issue in the retail financial services sector for the peculiar problems that it may pose for consumers. It analyses and reflects on the relevant case-law and guidance offered by the competent authorities, providing a new perspective on the inevitable interaction between EU competition law, the interest of consumers and their protection, and personal data protection. It suggests that the current state under competition law is unsatisfactory for being short-sighted and that the EU judiciary and policy makers should take a holistic approach encompassing consumer protection and fundamental rights.
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This work revisits the issue of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of information exchanges among competitors under EU competition law vis-à-vis the consumer interest. It takes the retail financial services sector to examine the sharing of consumer financial data among competing lenders for the tension between economic efficiency and the potential detriment that it may pose to consumers. The aim is to assess to what extent competition law, the case-law, and official guidance have provided clarity in the sector and at the same time have offered suitable solutions that work for consumers. The subject of the exchange of consumer financial information is special because if on the one hand it presents jurists with the usual difficulties inherent of this area of competition law, on the other hand it has a strong impact on consumer protection policy as well as on the interference of markets with fundamental rights. Likewise, retail finance is a well-known area where much work is still needed to achieve the internal market.​[1]​
So far, the debate has centred on the traditional view that information exchange is a common feature of competitive markets and it is either capable of generating efficiency gains or it may lead to restrictions of competition especially where undertakings become aware of market strategies of their competitors. The determination between the two depends on the features of the market in which the exchange takes place and the type of information exchanged.​[2]​ Likewise, until now the assessment of the consumer interest in the context of competition has mostly focused on market efficiency assuming that this maximises automatically economic gains for consumers, hence their welfare.​[3]​
Yet, an established aim of EU competition policy is the achievement of the objectives of the European treaties, which include the achievement of the internal market, the approximation of economic policies, the promotion of growth and the raising of living standards, etc. in a space where consumers receive an adequate protection. All under a framework which aims at the protection of the citizens’ fundamental rights.
In this context, new literature has started putting forward the concept that in tandem competition law and consumer law can and should guarantee adequate protection for consumers, not only safeguarding their immediate material prosperity but also raising their quality of life and redressing unfair situations in the market.​[4]​ Markets may work efficiently but not fairly, so competition and consumer law cannot work separately. Embracing this idea, this study moves a step forward adding to the equation the safeguard of fundamental rights as part of the consumer interest, where in truth it is the interest of society generally that reflects on the interest of consumers. Arguably, competition law cannot be oblivious of the type of society where Europeans aim to live in.
The peculiarity of the exchange of consumer financial data by financial entities offers such an opportunity, to show how competition law cannot be assessed in the abstract or in isolation. On the contrary, the suggestion is that a holistic approach encompassing consumer protection and fundamental rights is the desirable way forward.


1.	The exchange of consumer information in financial markets

Financial information exchanges among competing lenders in mortgage and consumer credit markets have become the instrument most extensively used to underwrite decisions on borrowings or the supply of goods and/or services to consumers.  Lenders pool their own credit information about customers or applicants to, and at the same time access credit information from, centralised databases managed by third party providers known as ‘credit bureaus’ in order to evaluate a consumer’s credit application and their creditworthiness.
The economic literature identifies the reduction of information asymmetry, adverse selection, and competition as justifications for the exchange of customers’ financial information.
The reduction of asymmetric information and adverse selection encompass several elements relating to market structure and marketing activities of participants. It affects risk management and pricing through the assessment of uncertainties about the ability and/or willingness of the debtor to repay, market entry and competition, customers’ creditworthiness, application processing and screening, customers’ segmentation and product specialisation, and improvement of credit portfolio.​[5]​
Moreover, the small or medium size of loans to consumers means that it is not cost-efficient to assess consumers on a case by case basis.​[6]​
Traditionally, when lenders evaluate borrowers to determine their creditworthiness for credit-risk assessment and management, they interview the applicants and ask them directly for personal information together with the relevant supporting documents. At the same time, they seek and gather information from their own databases developed through years of experience and business practice in the credit market.  Such a source of information, however, is incomplete as it covers a lender's own past and present customers, but it does not contain data about the same customers' past and/or present relationship with other financial institutions nor, from a competition perspective, information about new or prospective customers and their past and/or present relationship with other providers. Thus, it is with the view to supplement comprehensive information about these customers that information exchanges among competitors and sophisticated centralised databases emerged and developed in the past few decades.​[7]​
Moreover, consumer information may constitute a discipline device mechanism for borrowers who became aware that delays or defaults in re-payment compromise their reputation with all the other potential lenders on the market, resulting in credit with more costly terms or by cutting them off from credit entirely.​[8]​
As far as competition is concerned, the exchange of information on customer relationships or applicants reduces the information monopoly of individual lenders and the competitive advantage of large financial institutions. Although lenders lose the exclusivity of data in terms of competition one versus the other, they would ultimately gain by sharing information as this accumulation of data enables them to distinguish the good borrowers from the bad ones. Information sharing would serve as a tool to predict the future payment behaviour of applicants allowing lenders to attract good borrowers and offering them better terms and conditions, thus promoting market competition that could ultimately result in benefits to those ‘good consumers’.​[9]​ Hence, the adverse selection problem identified by the economic literature indicates that should lenders fail to distinguish the good borrowers from the bad ones, all accepted borrowers would be charged at a higher rate an average interest rate that mirrors their pooled experience.​[10]​ Therefore, the distinction between good borrowers from the bad ones allows lenders on the one hand to offer more advantageous prices to lower-risk borrowers while, on the other hand, higher risk borrowers are offered higher interest rates or can be rationed out of the market because of the lenders’ unwillingness to offer these borrowers accommodating rates or any credit at all.​[11]​
The problem of asymmetric information and adverse selection becomes greater for new market entrants, particularly foreign lenders. This is particularly the case in the context of the creation of the EU single market and cross-border entry or cross-border provision of financial services. In addition to competitive disadvantages in relation to incurring greater risks of incorrectly estimating a borrower’s credit risk, without relevant information on borrowers new market entrants would be likely to attract precisely those who were rejected by existing lenders in the market.​[12]​ This circumstances has induced recent literature to conclude that information sharing, market structure, and competitive conduct are intrinsically intertwined in the financial services market and, from the standpoint of industrial organisation, the availability of information shared by the sector can affect foreign lenders’ choice not only of whether to entry another jurisdiction but also the mode of doing it, i.e. whether through the cross-border provision of services, the setting up of branches or subsidiaries or through mergers and acquisitions.​[13]​ Therefore, on the one hand such strategies may well have the potential to influence the intensity of competition in national markets and among national providers. On the other hand, however, this is an indication that the behaviour of one or few market players – particularly existing lenders – influences and drives the behaviour of others, especially new entrants, which will decide their strategies on the experience, or market intelligence, of existing ones. Prima facie, considerations of the like may have the effect of casting doubts as to whether or to what extent in actual facts this may constitute a concerted practice or simply a reduction of market uncertainty.
Also, to the extent that information monopoly of individual lenders is reduced, the information monopoly is transferred to credit bureaus, which are third-party subjects. This, in turn, may raise new concerns over market competition and power.


2.	The traditional approach of EU competition law

Debates over the legitimacy of information exchanges among competitors vis-à-vis competition law in the EU are not new. Nonetheless, this traditionally remains one of the most sensitive and critical area of competition law. 
As a general rule, businesses must operate on the market independently of their competitors and they should not conform, adjust or coordinate their behaviour with that of competitors, including exchanging commercially sensitive information.​[14]​ Yet, questions as to what extent such exchanges should be permitted, and where to draw a line between anti-competitive behaviour and genuine business, remain grey and controversial areas which pose problems of legal certainty.​[15]​
According to economic theory, information exchanges are not necessarily anti-competitive. On the contrary, in order to make sound decisions and planning, companies need market intelligence and information pertaining to, and shared with, competitors. Appropriate information allows them to engage in benchmarking, have efficiency gains, plan production and investments, improve their marketing, and price products competitively.​[16]​
On the other hand, information exchanges can be anti-competitive to the extent that they may favour concerted practices in a particular sector, or it may serve for the establishment or stabilisation of cartels. When detailed information is exchanged within an industry, it may become easier for participating undertakings to act in concert, which is contrary to the fundamental nature of competition which requires that competitors act independently and not coordinate their behaviour in the market. In this perspective, market intelligence is a competitive strength or weakness of competing firms, where those who are better have gains, at the same time forcing the others to improve if they are to remain competitive on the market.​[17]​
Traditionally, all the case-law on the competitive or anti-competitive nature of the exchange of information, as well as the EU Commission’s interpretation and enforcement, have centred on the application of Article 101 TFEU (ex Art. 81 TEC).
Art. 101(1) and (2) TFEU prohibit and void all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect, actually or potentially, trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. Art. 101(3) TFEU, in turn, exempts agreements, decisions or concerted practices which contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods/services, at the same time allowing consumers a fair share of such benefit - the so-called ‘consumer interest’.
Prima facie, thus, any communication of information among competitors may be potentially dangerous from a competition law perspective. This is because the scope of Article 101 TFEU is broad and not only obvious anti-competitive agreements are caught by the prohibition, such as those on prices, production or marketing limits, and market allocation. Even in the absence of any such explicit or implicit agreements, Art. 101 TFEU proscribes concerted practices having as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition in the internal market which is a complex determination depending largely on the facts. Where it is clear that an agreement has as its object the restriction of competition, there is no need to demonstrate the anti-competitive effects.​[18]​ By contrast, whenever the object of the agreement is not so clear an effect analysis has to be conducted to determine whether this is or should be caught by Art. 101 TFEU vis-à-vis neutral or pro-competitive exchanges.

The CJEU has held that a concerted practice is 
“a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition.
By its very nature, then, a concerted practice does not have all the elements of a contract but may inter alia arise out of coordination which becomes apparent from the behaviour of the participants.
Conduct is such as to enable those concerned to attempt (…) to consolidate established positions to the detriment of effective freedom of movement of the products in the common market and of the freedom of consumers to choose their suppliers”.​[19]​

Established case law specifies that for an Art. 101 TFEU infringement to occur it is sufficient the existence of the wilful element (the “knowingly” above) even in the absence of actual anticompetitive effects on the market, so that it is not necessary that the conduct in fact produces the specific effect of restricting, preventing or distorting competition.​[20]​
As said, however, not all communications are prohibited but only the exchange of information which may have an effect on competition is incompatible with Art. 101(1) TFEU. As made clear in UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange, what indeed matters from an antitrust point of view is the actual exchange of confidential information, its level of aggregation, its frequency and accuracy, and the concentration of the reference market. In fact, to be pertinent, information needs to have sensitive market value for the undertaking possessing it, as information of non-confidential nature is not an issue by definition.​[21]​ Also, the more information is aggregated, i.e. the less detailed it is, the less hazardous it is for competition: transactions that reveal specific content are likely to be identifying, allowing the recognition of strategies of competitors or disclosing which data set belong to a specific competitor.​[22]​ To be compatible with competition law, information needs to be up-to-date and accurate too, as inaccurate communications may easily distort market behaviour and fairness in competition.​[23]​ Besides, in concentrated markets, the exchange of information is more likely to lead to collusive behaviour between market players, as it is easier to identify competitors’ behaviour and strategies. Secrecy and uncertainty of the behaviour or intelligence of the few players of a market may constitute the key factor left for residual competition and avoid tacit agreements or concerted practices. In addition, in a concentrated market the lack of participation in the exchange system prevents entry to new players as non-members would be penalised regardless of whether they join the system or not.​[24]​ If they do not, in fact, they would be penalised for not having access to such information. At the same time, if they decide and are allowed to join, they would be obliged to disclose and share with existing undertakings (i.e. their new competitors) sensitive or confidential information which, in turn, may allow the latter to avert new or aggressive market strategies by the new entrant. In case they do not have information to share, as new market entrants with no portfolio of information of the relevant market, they may well be prevented to join the system for lack of reciprocity.​[25]​
From the European case law and Commission’s practice, the literature observes how on the one side the exchange of core competitive information was treated as either enhancing or facilitating actual or potential collusive market behaviour or as an artificial enhancement of market transparency eliminating that uncertainty that is so important for competitive markets and market rivalry.​[26]​ From another angle, on the other side, economic theory continues to stress that market transparency may be positive for the ideal model of perfect competition premised on the elimination of information asymmetry about the market itself and the benefit that this offers to new market entrants vis-à-vis existing market players. At the same time, however, there is the recognition that increased market transparency can make the market more collusive, fixing prices and/or segmenting customers (welfare reducing) rather than providing more choice or broadening market access for customers (welfare improving). The key concern with transparency is that it allows for better monitoring and more effective punishment of deviating members or non-members.​[27]​




3.	Competition Law and the Retail Financial Sector

Against the illustrated case-by-case scenario, the position over the competitive or anti-competitive nature of information sharing holds also for the retail financial sector. A depicted pro-competitive effect of sharing knowledge over customers financial transactions is the reduction of information monopolies of large lenders, such as big mainstream banks, which not only put on the same competitive footing existing smaller competitors, but also new entrants in the market which would not enter the market or be at disadvantage pooling credit applicants previously rejected by incumbents.​[28]​ At EU level, this may be problematic to the extent that freedom of establishment and freedom to provide and receive services are cornerstones of the internal market. At the same time, one of the peculiarities is that this is a risk-averse industry. As seen, even though information sharing can serve strategic and competitive purposes, it is mainly used for credit risk diminution and the reduction of market uncertainty, where the main concern is to screen out or price higher risks more.
Looking at EU competition law, also in the financial services sector any assessment of the legitimacy of the exchange of consumer financial information should investigate the characteristics of the European consumer credit market against the concept of concerted practices and actual or potential anti-competitive effects, in particular against the concentration of the reference market, the regularity of the exchanges, the confidential nature and the level of aggregation of the information, as well as its accuracy.​[29]​
The picture in the EU is fragmented. Not all Member States have in place centralised systems for the exchange of consumer information. Nonetheless, some common traits exist, especially where the supply of information to the market is organised by commercial ventures, known as private credit bureaus. As participation by lenders in a privately owned consumer credit information system is not compulsory, the rules relating to the functioning of the system are not imposed by law or regulation but are contracted in a typical supplier-client relationship. The negotiating power of a lender changes from country to country depending on a number of factors, including for example competition in that market and/or maturity of the system, i.e., whether the information provider is a start-up activity with no or little client members or a well-established one with wide market participation, as well as other conceivable situations in the between. The credit data collected and processed are supplied to the centralised database by the lenders themselves, who in this way exchange information and build the database itself. By way of contractual agreement, the information is supplied by the lenders on a reciprocal basis, i.e. the lenders are able to access the databases only if they contribute to it for the benefit of all the other contributing member lenders. Databases may be supplemented by non-credit data collected from other sources.​[30]​ Thus, financial and non-financial entities have access to consumer information across different economic segments. In this way, accessibility to full credit and other non-credit data may affect the inclusion, exclusion, or sorting in different economic spheres of the consumers.
The CJEU had the opportunity to shed light on the fine line between anti-competitive behaviour and genuine business in the exchange of consumer financial information in the case Asnef Equifax v. Ausbanc (hereinafter Asnef),​[31]​ which involved a Spanish private credit bureau. It concerned the circumstances in which banks could exchange information about the solvency and creditworthiness of their consumer customers.
The Spanish High Court referred to the CJEU for a ruling whether such information exchange was in breach of then Art.81 TEC [Art. 101 TFEU] and whether such an agreement could be authorised by a national competition authority under then Art. 81(3) TEC [Art. 101(3) TFEU] in case the implementation of the agreement could benefit consumers.
The opinion of the Advocate General (A-G) anticipated the judgement confirming that the case-law on information exchanges “does not prohibit all elimination of uncertainty generally, but only certain types of uncertainty, in particular uncertainty about the conduct of competitors on the market”.​[32]​ The A-G was of the opinion that credit bureaus remove uncertainty of the solvency of customers, not of the behaviour of competitors, to favour competition.​[33]​
Reaffirming the principles of precedent case-law, the CJEU followed the opinion of the A-G clarifying that compatibility with EU competition law cannot be assessed in the abstract but it depends on the economic conditions on the relevant markets and on specific characteristics of the system concerned. In particular, relevance should be given to its purpose, the conditions of access and participation, the type of information exchanged, its periodicity, its importance for the fixing of prices, volumes or conditions of service, and its accuracy.​[34]​
In conclusion, in the first part of the judgement, the CJEU ruled that an information exchange of credit bureaus is in principle permissible if:
-	Relevant markets are not highly concentrated;
-	The system does not allow lenders to be identified;
-	The conditions of access to the system are not discriminatory, in law or in fact.​[35]​
However, the Court acknowledged that, even if the object of the information exchange was not to restrict competition, it could have had the effect of doing so.​[36]​
In the second part of the ruling, therefore, the CJEU looked at the consumer fair share, or consumer interest, under then Art. 81(3) TEC [Art. 101(3) TFEU] if the referring court finds that there is a reduction in competition. The CJEU held that the national court should focus on the consumer fair share of the profit resulting from the information exchange, which in the case at hand is that credit bureaus are capable of helping to prevent consumer over-indebtedness and overall offering a greater availability of credit, as well as of favouring the mobility of consumers.​[37]​ All in all, in the view of the CJEU such economic advantages might be such as to offset the disadvantages of a possible restriction on competition, which is a circumstance for national courts to verify.​[38]​
The key determination of the ‘consumer interest’ was that, if some consumers pay more or they are refused credit as a result of information sharing, this cannot prevent the condition that consumers are allowed fair share of the benefit.​[39]​ In the reasoning of the CJEU, “under Art. 81(3) EC [Art. 101(3) TFEU] it is the beneficial nature of the effect on all consumers in the relevant markets that must be taken into consideration, not the effect on each member of that category of consumers” [emphasis added].​[40]​ Moreover, according to the learned judges, since credit bureaus are capable of leading to a greater availability of credit, it is beneficial for applicants for whom interest rates might be higher if lenders didn’t know of their personal situation.​[41]​
The requisite of ‘indispensability’ of the final part of Art. 101(3) was not investigated by the CJEU but it is nevertheless explicit in the provision itself and cannot be overlooked. Any restriction which satisfies the efficiency gains and the fair-share of consumers should be strictly necessary to the attainment of these objectives, and the parties will need to prove that data content, aggregation, age, confidentiality, frequency, and coverage carry the lowest risk indispensable for creating the claimed gains.
The European Commission has recently issued the ‘Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements’ (Guidelines).​[42]​ For the first time, these include a section on the general principles on the competitive assessment of information exchanges. By replacing previous guidelines for the assessment of cooperation agreements between competitors,​[43]​ the novelty of adding a chapter on information exchanges has been welcome by some for providing some clarity, especially by consolidating the jurisprudence first analysed in this paper.​[44]​ If on the one hand they are designed to help undertakings determine whether their co-operation agreements are compatible with the revised competition rules by providing the above-discussed criteria for assessing the application of the competition rules, on the other hand they maintain that context-specific approach that reverts on a case-by-case assessment basis, which may be considered as of limited value.​[45]​
In the end, for the exchange of information in the financial services sector Asnef provides financial institutions with the precedent giving certainty over the practice of sharing consumer information in the EU, albeit negative information only. For instance, following the CJEU decision Spain approved a block exemption regulation for the exchange of information of consumer defaults.​[46]​
However, certainty is not synonymous with justice or righteousness. At a closer scrutiny of issues affecting personal information of individuals, the case may be criticised on a number of grounds. Most of them concern doubts over uncharted assumptions of the sharing of private financial information of consumers by private dominant companies, alongside concerns over the reading and meaning of what accounts as the ‘consumer interest’.


4.	Pro-Competitive Effects of information exchanges

A clarification of the conditions in which financial institutions may exchange consumer financial information in the EU from a competition law perspective represents a much needed effort to shed light on a traditionally controversial area of law. Under this perspective, efforts to remove uncertainty and guide national competition authorities towards a common approach in the EU are positive per se.
From the perspective of the financial industry and the establishment of the EU market, information exchange may have an encouraging effect on certain types of market entry mode of new or foreign lenders in another Member State. An increase in the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions is often seen as an indicator of more integrated markets.​[47]​ Foreign lenders who acquire or merge with an existing market player could benefit from the latter pre-existing participation in an information exchange system. Similarly, as made clear by the CJEU, newly set-up institutions or institutions that establish a branch in another Member State shall not be discriminated in the participation in such a system. This is at least in law, where the CJEU decision provides for the guarantee of accessibility to all operators in order not to be placed at disadvantage for the purpose of risk assessment.​[48]​ 
Looking at the issue of non-discrimination in fact, however, this may be more complex by the requirement of reciprocity inherent in information exchange systems: those who want to participate and receive information need necessarily provide information. The problem is that credit bureaus are national systems and usually the condition for participation is the supply of lenders’ data portfolio. This is reciprocity principle is the bloodline of any information exchange system. Reciprocity is theoretically possible but it may be hard to meet, if not impossible, for new institutions or foreign lenders which do not have a national portfolio of data. Existing participants to what is a voluntary system, and who are at the same time the clients of private credit bureaus and pay for their services, may be reluctant to share their portfolio of data with competitors in return for nothing, or later data as the new competing businesses develop and gain a share of the market. As reported by economic literature, participants to a voluntary information exchange system are traditionally adverse to free-riders in the system.​[49]​ In the end, therefore, from this angle the CJEU position and the Guidelines may serve the purpose of competition forcing existing market players not to obstruct newcomers, not only in law but also in fact, giving to the latter legal tools for enforcement. As such, they should be applauded. Rather, the question could be whether credit bureaus in a voluntary system will be forced to contract with them, undermining basic principles of contract law. This is, however, a matter for further research to explore.
Conversely, if on the one hand clarity and pro-market entry of foreign lenders represent helpful steps and lights for a EU competitive market integration, on the other hand the position of the CJEU and the Commission raise a number of questions which nurture concerns on a number of several other accounts.


5.	The economic and legal assumptions

The theory surrounding the exchange of consumer information by private entities is controversial. Ignoring tout court behavioural economics, it is premised on economic assumptions that look at past behaviour as being predictive of future behaviour, as well as repayment behaviour of consumers as reputation collateral for their future behaviour. These assumptions find no justification in a relationship of cause and effect. Likewise, despite limited but undemonstrated claims to the contrary,​[50]​ there is no conclusive or empirical evidence that support such economic theories. On the contrary, failure to repay debts by consumers has been found to be mostly grounded on life-time events such as poor macro-economic conditions, job losses, illness or family deaths, separation and divorce, etc. that cannot be predicted with credit histories and could penalise consumers even further if used as reputation collateral.​[51]​ 
Unfortunately, the CJEU never investigated the debatable nature of these economic premises but it endorsed them uncritically.​[52]​ By contrast, consumer associations have widely voiced concerns about the ability of credit data to adequately reflect individual situations as well as how the data are assessed.​[53]​ Moreover, the CJEU and the Commission confused or omitted to consider models of Member States where commercial registries do not exist, such as those where the absence of private bureaus does not prevent them to be on the same footing with other Member States in terms of credit provision or likelihood of debt repayment by consumers. For example, no evidence suggests that Belgium or France are problematic jurisdictions in terms of default rates or household over-indebtedness compared with the Netherlands, Italy or the UK.​[54]​
By contrast, the CJEU suggested that “the necessary participation of the credit institutions in that register inevitably entails a certain amount of cooperation between competitors in the form of an indirect exchange of credit information” ​[55]​ [emphasis added], thus making applicable Art. 101 TFEU and excluding from the outset “any need to characterise precisely the form of the cooperation thus established between those institutions”​[56]​ [emphasis added]. As seen above, however, one of the distinguishing features of private credit bureaus is the voluntary and contractual nature of the relationship between the latter and the participating lenders. Quite the opposite, if anything, the private contractual nature of the relationship may represent a problem in terms of bank competition. Previous studies have pointed out how the use of credit bureaus can be used for the strategic foreclosure of existing and new market entrants, especially in the case of large banks which may have the incentive not to disclose their complete portfolio of borrowers in terms of either comprehensiveness or accuracy of information to deter others from benefiting from it.​[57]​ 
At any rate, as the focus is on the conduct to be taken with regard to the risks presented by applicants, it would be a source of concern if in so reasoning the CJEU accepted and legitimised the classification or sorting of consumers, where operators are entitled to divide people in economic segments in which they are expected to act independently and autonomously by specialising in the market segment of choice, but at the same time being reciprocally influenced within the same segment. This interpretation would also support the practice of economic sorting which, in the area of financial services for consumers, may easily translate in social sorting and impact on the social sphere of individuals. If this view has to be rejected, it remains the conundrum relating to the relationship between the ‘necessity’ of participation in a voluntary information exchange system, independent and autonomous behaviour in market segmentation, and expected behaviour within market segments in theory and in practice.
All the above is compounded by the consideration that the CJEU reasoning assumes accuracy of the information exchanged, where accuracy is intertwined with universal coverage and participation. In fact, an incomplete system, or a system where not all market participants adhere, is inaccurate by definition precisely for the information that is not there. At the same time, the concept of a system that is voluntary and governed by private law (contract), and at the same time requires to be universal in participation and coverage is a contradictio in terminis, if not in adiecto.
An additional point to consider is that information exchanged in a voluntary system is not verified or vetted but it relies on the unilateral determination of those who provide it, a circumstance which not only poses challenges to the authority of such information to determine who is and who is not creditworthy, but ultimately it impinges on accuracy.
Another point needs attention. On the one hand the CJEU rules that information exchange of credit bureaus is in principle permissible if relevant markets are not highly concentrated.​[58]​ On the other hand this determination clashes with the reality of markets in retail financial services in the EU. The latest sector inquiry of the Commission reports that several markets in the EU suffer from high concentration levels.​[59]​ Such findings, if applied to the case-law of the CJEU, would probably outlaw the majority of information exchanges by credit bureaus, unless the third limb of Art. 101 TFEU is applied and the concentration allows consumers a fair share of the benefit.




6.	The Consumer Interest and Responsible Lending

The market for loans available to consumers, be it consumer or mortgage credit, has grown rapidly in the last decade across the EU and it is becoming increasingly sophisticated.  However, with the development of the retail and mortgage credit markets European consumers are becoming increasingly indebted. The growth of the over-indebtedness of consumers is becoming a concern for national and EU policy-makers alike. Besides, the on-going global credit and financial crisis has raised important issues regarding the protection of consumers in financial markets and the need for additional safeguards to stem the social problems that the crisis has exacerbated.​[60]​
Therefore, alongside the advancement of measures for the cross-border provision of credit and the abolition of obstacles for further integration, the promotion of responsible lending and borrowing policies to limit the over-indebtedness of European consumers are high on the EU agenda. Likewise, the importance of the relationship between borrowers and financial institutions is under the close scrutiny of European policy makers.
Responsible lending and borrowing is a recent policy introducing a novel concept to tackle consumers’ over-indebtedness. It makes reference to the delivery of responsible and reliable markets, as well as the restoration of consumer confidence, where credit products are appropriate for consumers’ needs and are tailored to their ability to repay their debts. They envisage a framework that could ensure that all lenders and intermediaries act in a fair, honest and professional manner before, during, and after the lending transaction. Similarly, it is expected that in order to obtain credit consumers provide relevant, complete and accurate information on their finances. They are also encouraged to make informed and sustainable borrowing decisions.​[61]​ Against such policy context, the exchange of consumers’ financial information and the use of centralised databases are regarded not only as an assessment of consumers’ creditworthiness for risk management but also as a tool to identify the over-indebtedness of individuals. If on the one hand this assertion may support a valid argument for the exchange of information for the benefit of consumers, on the other hand it remains open to debate whether the design of commercial databases is proportionate to the policy goals to be achieved and to what extent the level of aggregation or detail of information exceeds the purpose for its sharing. Whilst the first issue exceeds the scope of this work and has been addressed elsewhere,​[62]​ the type and level of detail or aggregation of information bear elements relevant to many areas of law of policy, including competition law and data protection which will be addressed later.


7.	In the Interest of whose Consumers?

Art. 101(3) TFEU exempts from the prohibition set forth in Art. 101(1) when the benefits resulting from a concerted practice outweigh the its distortive effects, particularly on those occasions where it improves the production or distribution of goods or promotes technical or economic progress, at the same time allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.
The justification for this legal exception is that an aim of EU completion law is the protection of competition to enhance consumer welfare and ensure the optimal allocation of resources in the marketplace, thus making it necessary to balance possible efficiency gains vis-à-vis anticompetitive effects and assess the net effect of an agreement or concerted practice.
In Asnef, the CJEU ruled that if the referring court finds that there is a restriction of competition in the information exchange under the criteria set in the first part of the ruling, then it is necessary to conduct an assessment under the exception provided in Art. 101(3) and its four cumulative conditions.
In the assessment of the ‘fair share’ of the profit for consumers, the CJEU established that credit bureaus “are capable of helping to prevent situations of overindebtedness for consumers” and overall lead to a greater availability of credit and favour the mobility of consumers.​[63]​ The CJEU starting point is vitiated by the assignment of social functions to private companies and their role in the economy, including questions as to who entrusted them with public functions, and the type and amount of information necessary to achieve that goal. Similarly, for the reasons first explained above, the reference to the greater mobility of consumers signifies that the CJEU had in mind national markets and not the EU internal market. Ultimately, it puts into question how certain jurisdictions such as those without commercial credit bureaus could cope without them. What is probably more problematic, however, is the conclusion that such economic advantages might be such as to offset the disadvantages of a possible restriction on competition, leaving it to national courts to verify that.​[64]​
The CJEU admits that, owing to the existence of credit bureaus, certain consumers will be faced with increased interest rates or be refused credit. However, in the CJEU view the fact that some consumers will pay more or are refused credit cannot prevent the condition that consumers are allowed a fair share of the benefit.​[65]​ The problem is that such consumers are those usually identified as the ‘vulnerable consumers’,​[66]​ including over-indebted people, who will pay more or be economically and socially excluded.​[67]​ Nonetheless, disregarding any possible social concern or regard for minorities, the CJEU is of the view that under Art. 101(3) it is the beneficial nature of the effect on all consumers in the relevant markets that must be taken into consideration, not the effect on each member of that category of consumers.​[68]​ Under the assumption that credit bureaus are capable of leading to a greater availability of credit, they become beneficial for applicants whom interest rates might be higher if lenders did not know of their personal situation as portrayed by credit data.​[69]​
The main question that arises is what consumer the CJEU had in mind. Arguably, the dismissal of the effects on vulnerable consumers is worrying per se. Moreover, the CJEU is not concerned to investigate why consumers may not have repaid certain debts or paid them late but nevertheless repaid (adding additional interest rates to the repayment). As already noted, life-time events such as illness, divorce, job losses, etc. and/or poor market conditions in the economy are the major causes of consumer failure to repay debts timely or over-indebtedness.​[70]​ These situations cannot be caught or resolved by credit data and their exchange.
Additional questions arise: what about those who are not in the databases? Why should they be left out?
The impression is that the consumer that the judiciary and policy makers had in mind is an elite consumer, forming in itself a category of consumers, who has developed a financial CV, with an immaculate credit history and absence of problems beyond the unwillingness to repay a debt. This portray shows a disconnection with social problems and the protection of the vulnerable members of society, bearing in mind that any person may fall in that category at any time in life.
If the consumer interest lies at the heart of competition policy, and the maximisation of consumer welfare features prominently among its goals, the idea that ‘all consumers' coincide with those who are in the databases, and among them those who are best placed in society but who may become vulnerable at any time, may be undesirable and set a dangerous precedent.
Moreover, because competition law is in large part designed to promote markets which work for consumers and serve their interest, the concept of who is the consumer and what their interest is needs to be broader and more inclusive. Indeed, substantial parts of European consumer law are designed precisely to deal with situations where markets do not function fairly even when they may work efficiently, embracing the concept of consumer protection especially in the area of financial services.​[71]​


8.	The Consumer Interest and Data Protection

If the traditional justification of consumer protection and law is to correct market failures and readjust the position of consumers in the market vis-à-vis businesses, social justice and the redistribution of wealth are becoming increasingly important rationales of consumer policy and law to realign the position of consumers in society.​[72]​
Likewise, fundamental rights of individuals are becoming a dominant component of EU law. The interaction between fundamental rights recognised by the EU and markets is not new to the literature.​[73]​ Nonetheless, the case at study offers a textbook exemplification where professed economic efficiency may interfere with fundamental rights.
Personal financial data are the backbone of the information exchange among competitors and its relationship with competition law. Obviously, therefore, in collecting, processing, and disseminating the personal data of consumers in financial operations, credit bureaus and lenders must, like any other European data controller, comply with data protection legislation. 
Even if it is not the scope of this work to undertake a thorough investigation of data protection and its interference with business law and markets, few words become nevertheless necessary in the examination of information exchange and competition matters.
Personal data protection is a distinctive European innovation in law. Directive 95/46/EC​[74]​ on data protection was first passed to serve the double purpose of both ensuring the free movement of personal data in the EU internal market and guaranteeing a high level of normative protection for data subjects. Since its enactment, the EU legislator has consistently taken a rigorous ‘fundamental human rights’ approach. This stance is particularly important because it means that data protection automatically trumps other interests and, at least in theory, should not be traded-off for economic benefits.​[75]​ With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this position is now explicit. Article 16 TFEU elevates the provision on data protection to a ‘provision of general application’ under Title II alongside other fundamental principles of the EU. It also imposes on the EU legislator to establish a certain and unequivocal legal framework for data protection, culminated in a proposal in the form of a Regulation.​[76]​ Equally, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has become binding, and in its Article 8 it recognizes the protection of personal data as an autonomous right distinguished from ‘privacy’.
Even if the decision in Asnef precedes the Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU was not oblivious of the role of data protection law but it dissociated it from competition law. Holding that “any possible issue relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not a matter of competition law and must be resolved on the basis of the relevant provisions governing data protection”,​[77]​ the CJEU seems to suggest that as long as the parties involved comply with the requirements of data protection law, this is not a matter concerning competition. The Court has shown to be not interested in investigating whether information exchanges among competitors comply with requirements of data minimisation, purpose limitation, necessariety, consent, or other legitimising elements for the data exchange.​[78]​ It gives compliance for assumed. Yet, consumer financial data exchanged by credit bureaus are not processed for competition purposes and, arguably, are caught by purpose limitation provisions, i.e. lenders may find it difficult to justify information sharing for competition purposes where risk-management is the alleged purpose. At the same time, it is interesting to note that in another decision Asnef and Fecemd vs. Administración del Estado​[79]​ the same Courts justifies the processing of negative data on grounds of the legitimate interest of the credit industry, not of consumers. The processing of positive data remains on the consent of the consumer, which is imposed if they do not want to be refused credit and trade under the terms imposed by the financial industry.​[80]​
These are not trivial issues but in a broader policy context they may probably be treated as legal niceties. Indeed, it is on policy grounds that this work aspires to transfer the discussion, particularly since the EU already recognises explicitly that “the respect of private and family life and the protection of personal data are much bigger issues than just a commercial debate”.​[81]​ The position taken by the EU is that even if commercial entities use personal data to gain commercial advantage vis-à-vis users, consumer policy needs to intervene to prevent not only abusive behaviours but also commercial manipulation.​[82]​
Yet, credit bureaus raise issues of consumer classification, standardisation, simplification, sorting, discrimination, financial inclusion of some and exclusion of others. Overall, consumer credit data seem to drive the conforming of consumer behaviours to the economic needs of the credit industry under market tenets of the neo-liberal ideology.​[83]​ All these undesirable outcomes are direct consequences of profiling, which comprises any form of automated processing of personal data intended to analyse or predict economic situations or behaviours.​[84]​
The problem is that, at least in theory, it is not a declared task of competition policy to tackle potentially abusive commercial behaviours that become accepted in competitive markets.​[85]​ However, commercial entities like credit bureaus have exclusive access to personal data in the consumer credit market and could give rise to concentration concerns, which is where personal financial data may become a competition issues anytime consumers become prevented from switching to other lenders or access others in a new relationship.
Whatever the answer, competition law is there for an efficient functioning of markets, which are ultimately supposed to work for consumers. Another problem is that the consumer interest is seen only as a short-term economic gain, which in the area of financial services raises the question whether this is consumer welfare or, rather, longer-term views are necessary. Taking a holistic view, may economic sorting, economic classification, and economic discrimination ever be in the consumer interest?
It is true that pursuant to Art. 169 TFEU under Title XV - Consumer Protection –explicit reference is made to the economic interest for the promotion of the consumer interest alongside their health, safety, and rights to information, education, and organisation.
Nonetheless, if in the early days the Commission was criticised for treating the consumer benefit of Art. 101(3) as a formal condition automatically satisfied if the agreement produced an immediate economic or technical benefit, robust calls and further Commission actions have taken place for a more analytical approach to the determination of the benefit to consumers.​[86]​ 
Looking at the case at hand, information processing and technologies have a clear potential to influence the lives of people and this puts an exceptional power in the hands of those who use them—a risk that has only recently been perceived by business and consumer associations alike.​[87]​ Data protection finds its roots in the idea that democratic societies should not be turned into systems of power resting on control, surveillance, actual or predictive profiling, classification, standardization, simplification, social sorting and discrimination of their citizens. Data protection is not only a matter of individual liberty, intimacy, and dignity of individuals but a wider personality right aimed at developing people’s social identity as citizens and consumers alike. Granting to individuals control over their personal information is not only a tool to allow them control over the persona they project in society free from unreasonable or unjustified associations, manipulations, distortions, misrepresentations, alterations or constraints on their true identity. It is also a fundamental value pertaining to humans to keep and develop their personality in a manner that allows them to fully participate in society without having to conform thoughts, beliefs, behaviours or preferences to those of the majority or those set from above by the industry for commercial interest.​[88]​ In this sense, the rights conferred by data protection legislation are participatory rights of informational self-determination.






The problems relating to the legitimacy of information exchanges among competitors under EU competition law are not new and they have been already discussed by economic and legal scholarship. The bulk of case-law, guidelines by policy-makers, and academic debates confirm the difficulty of elaborating general and theoretical rules to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges. They all point to the need of taking a case-by-case approach embracing the economic context in which participants to the information exchange operate. This work revisited the issue of consumer financial information sharing in the EU retail financial market with regard to competition law, market integration, and the interest of consumers. It attempted to offer a new angle and critical reading of the law.
The case-law attempts to provide a clarification of the conditions in which financial institutions may operate. At the same time, it delegates national courts to determine whether the relevant markets are not concentrated, the system does not allow for the identification of lenders, and the conditions of access to the system are not discriminatory in law or in fact, which in turn results in a case-by-case determination.
Equally, the guidelines provided by policy makers are meant to provide legal clarity to market players, incorporating and consolidating the case-law of the CJEU.
This work has recognised few virtues of information sharing as far as the pro-competitive entry of foreign lenders and their non-discrimination are concerned. At the same time, however, it censures the interpretation and application of the law for relying on assumptions provided by the credit industry that are questionable and need demonstration.
The main critique concerns the interpretation of the judiciary and policy makers of the fair share of the benefit for consumers, or the consumer interest. Restating the assumptions upon which data sharing is based, and assigning to the credit bureau industry social functions well beyond their remit, the judiciary first considers that the benefit should be on all consumers in the relevant market and not on members of categories of consumers, then it specifies that such benefit is for those consumers whom interest rates would be higher if lenders did not share information, thus referring to members of a category of consumers. The latter are those who are already in the databases and have a good credit history. However, it leaves out those who do not have a credit history as well as the vulnerable consumers, taking into account that the vulnerable consumers is not a static group of people but that any consumer may potentially become vulnerable. Regardless of this reflection, the interpretation of who are ‘all consumers’ for the calculation of the benefit bears important social concerns and issues of social inclusion, access, and justice.
This is the same reason why this work is also critical with the interpretation of what should be accounted as ‘consumer benefit’ in the area of consumer financial services. It is aware of the tendency to interpret it as a short-term economic gain. At the same time, however, it argues that economic sorting, classification, discrimination, and generally the conforming of behaviours dictated by few market players are vital issues for the kind of society where free citizens want to live in, and therefore they should be included in the calculus. The ultimate suggestion is that fundamental rights such as data protection should be introduced in the equation to protect long-term interests of society generally which will reflect on consumers as citizens.
All in all, the main conclusion is that the exchange of consumer financial data in the retail financial sector remains a conundrum with many more far-reaching elements to be looked at than those determined by the Courts and policy makers.
As far as competition is concerned, in particular, it has already been demonstrated empirically that private credit bureaus do not show effects on market structure.​[89]​ At the same time, they raise the concerns discussed above in this work.
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